Security-aware selection of Web Services for Reliable Composition by Khani, S. et al.
Khani, S., Gacek, C. & Popov, P. T. (2015). Security-aware selection of Web Services for Reliable 
Composition. Paper presented at the 11th European Dependable Computing Conference, Student 
Forum, September 7-11 2015, Paris, France. 
City Research Online
Original citation: Khani, S., Gacek, C. & Popov, P. T. (2015). Security-aware selection of Web 
Services for Reliable Composition. Paper presented at the 11th European Dependable Computing 
Conference, Student Forum, September 7-11 2015, Paris, France. 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/12786/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
  
Security-aware selection of Web Services for Reliable 
Composition 
Shahedeh A.khani 
Centre for Software Reliability, 
City University,  
London, 
United Kingdom 
abdolhossein.shahedeh.1@city.ac.uk 
 
Cristina Gacek 
Centre for Software Reliability,  
City University,  
London, 
United Kingdom 
cristina.gacek.1@city.ac.uk 
 
Peter Popov 
Centre for Software Reliability,  
City University,  
London, 
United Kingdom 
p.t.popov@city.ac.uk 
 
Abstract— Dependability is an important characteristic that a 
trustworthy computer system should have. It is a measure of 
Availability, Reliability, Maintainability, Safety and Security. 
The focus of our research is on security of web services. Web 
services enable the composition of independent services with 
complementary functionalities to produce value-added services, 
which allows organizations to implement their core business only 
and outsource other service components over the Internet, either 
pre-selected or on-the-fly. The selected third party web services 
may have security vulnerabilities. Vulnerable web services are of 
limited practical use. We propose to use an intrusion-tolerant 
composite web service for each functionality that should be 
fulfilled by a third party web service. The third party services 
employed in this approach should be selected based on their 
security vulnerabilities in addition to their performance. The 
security vulnerabilities of the third party services are assessed 
using a penetration testing tool. In this paper we present our 
preliminary research work.      
Keywords— Web Services; Selection; Security; Penetration 
Testing 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Web Services (WSs) are used to implement Service 
Oriented Architectures (SOAs). Each service consists of an 
implementation that is on a network-accessible platform and 
an interface. The communication with WSs is supported by 
Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) [1], which is a 
standard protocol for packaging messages before transmitting 
them through standard Internet technologies. Web Service 
Description Language (WSDL) [2] is used to describe the 
interface of a WS, describing the concrete structure of the 
SOAP messages (description of the operations and their input 
and output parameters), the service’s protocol binding and 
network location for the WS’s implementation (e.g. the URL). 
SOAP messages and WSDL documents are based on 
eXtensible Markup Language (XML), which has simplified 
the interoperability of the various technologies employed in 
WS development. 
WSs enable the composition of independent services with 
complementary functionalities to produce value-added 
services, which allows organizations to implement their core 
business only and outsource other service components over 
the Internet, either pre-selected or on-the-fly. However, WSs 
are open to a large population of users therefore, maintaining 
their security is an important task. Security attacks on WSs 
may cause unavailability and/or loss of confidentiality and 
integrity as well as significant monetary penalties.  Now the 
question is what if the selected third party WSs have security 
vulnerabilities? Vulnerable WSs are of limited practical use. 
Therefore, security should also be considered in selection and 
employment of suitable third party WSs.  
Our objective is to improve the dependability of composite 
WSs in which third party WSs are used. Our focus is on the 
security of WSs. Web services are at risk of security 
vulnerabilities related to their specific implementation 
technologies (e.g. XML) as well as those of their underlying 
platforms (e.g. operating systems and web-services 
frameworks) and the WS applications themselves (e.g. being 
vulnerable to SQL injection attacks). Security vulnerabilities 
related to WSs’ implementation technologies are central to the 
work described in this paper. We propose to use an intrusion-
tolerant composite WS (using fault tolerant techniques: N-
version programming, diversity) for each functionality that 
should be fulfilled by a third party WS. In our approach, 
penetration testing is used to identify security vulnerabilities 
of available functionally-equivalent candidate third party WSs. 
Suitable third party WSs will then be selected based on their 
security vulnerabilities and their performance according to the 
client’s (being the owner of the system) requirements. The 
selected services will be invoked using an intrusion-tolerant 
approach as a countermeasure against the security attacks 
exploiting the vulnerabilities that are not covered/identified by 
penetration testing. 
This paper makes the following contributions:  It explains our proposed approach in details.  It exemplifies our approach using a case study. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. 
Related work is discussed in Section II. Section III briefly 
introduces WSs’ specific security vulnerabilities. Penetration 
testing and the tool we are using are discussed Section IV. 
Sections V and VI present our proposed approach and the case 
study respectively. Section VII draws the conclusions and 
outlines future work. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Various intrusion detection and prevention methods and 
approaches have been proposed to secure WSs. However, in 
addition to the adoption of the proposed methods and 
  
approaches, WSs should also be able to tolerate attacks and 
continue to provide an acceptable level of service even after 
intruders have broken in. Intrusion-tolerant systems can be 
developed using fault-tolerance concepts and approaches.  
Redundancy is believed to be a valid defence against 
physical faults. Running multiple replicas of the system and 
switching to the functioning one when a failure occurs, is an 
example of using redundancy to overcome hardware faults 
[3]–[5]. Redundancy can also be applied to the code, data, and 
environment of a software system to overcome its nonphysical 
faults [6]. Design diversity is a recognised defence against 
design faults. Littlewood, Popov and Strigini [7] have 
surveyed the benefits of design diversity. Carzaniga, Gorla 
and Pezzè [8]  describe the redundancy as a system's 
capability of executing the same functionality in several 
execution environments or in various ways (e.g. using 
different execution paths). Littlewood and Strigini [9] have 
argued the validity of using redundancy and diversity for 
security.  
Majorczyk et al. [10] have proposed Intrusion Detection 
Systems (IDS) based on redundancy and diversification of 
Components-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) and have applied it to 
web servers. Valdes et al. [11] have proposed an intrusion-
tolerant web server architecture based on redundant COTS 
servers running on diverse operating systems and platforms. 
Gorbenko et al. [12] have proposed a generic intrusion-
avoidance architecture to be used for deploying WSs in the 
cloud. This architecture employs software diversity at various 
system levels and dynamically reconfigures the cloud 
deployment environment. All above approaches use 
redundancy and diversity techniques to detect and tolerate the 
intrusions. However, none of them addresses the attacks 
exploiting the vulnerabilities caused by the XML standards, 
which are independent of the type of operating systems or 
application implementation. Massimo Ficco and Massimiliano 
Rak [13] have proposed an intrusion tolerance approach for 
DoS attacks to WSs. It focuses on the detection of attack 
symptoms, as well as the diagnosis of intrusion effects in order 
to take appropriate action only when the attack succeeds. This 
work is more related to our approach. However, it focuses on a 
specific group of XML DoS attacks, called Deeply-Nested 
XML.  
III. WEB SERVICES’ SPECIFIC SECURITY VULNERABILITIES 
As stated previously, the communication between WSs is 
supported by XML-based protocols. This makes WSs 
vulnerable to XML attacks (vulnerabilities related to their 
specific implementation technologies). Examples of recently 
reported security attacks exploiting such vulnerabilities are the 
attacks on Amazon EC2 SOAP, Eucalyptus cloud WS 
interfaces [14], [15], different SAML-based frameworks [16] 
and ciphertext decryption exploitation [17]. Jensen et al. [18], 
[19] present a list of top WSs’ specific security vulnerabilities 
(related to the implementation technologies). To identify these 
security vulnerabilities, they have performed exemplary 
attacks on widespread WS implementations. According to the 
study, some of these vulnerabilities are due to implementation 
weaknesses but majority of them are due to protocol flaws. In 
this section we briefly introduce a number of these security 
vulnerabilities. 
A. Attack Obfuscation 
WS-Security [20] is a very flexible security standard that 
allows signing and encrypting only parts of the message, 
which contains sensitive data. A disadvantage of using this 
standard is that the encrypted content may not be inspected 
without prior decryption. Such encryption can be used by 
attackers to conceal malicious code. Therefore, if the 
encrypted part of the message contains an intended attack (e.g. 
Denial of Service attack.), it will be very difficult to detect. 
B. XML Injection 
An XML Injection attacker tries to modify the structure of 
a XML document (e.g. SOAP message) by adding some 
contents containing XML tags. 
C. SOAPAction Spoofing 
A SOAP message package consists of a transport protocol 
header and an envelope. The SOAP envelope consists of a 
header and a body. The first child element of the body 
contains the operation addressed by the SOAP request [18]. If 
the HTTP transport protocol is used, an additional operation 
identifier element called SOAPAction can be added to the 
header [18]. This enables the receiving WS to understand what 
operation the SOAP body contains, prior to XML parsing [21]. 
However, it is often used as the only qualifier for the 
requested operation [22].   
A WS will be vulnerable to a SOAPAction spoofing attack 
if the requested operation is identified solely based on the 
SOAPAction value or first child element of the SOAP body 
[22]. A successful SOAPAction Spoofing attack will result in 
unauthorised execution of operations offered by the WS. 
D. Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks 
Early steps in processing a request SOAP message include 
parsing and transforming the contents of the message to be 
usable by the WS’s backend applications.  Therefore, the 
XML parser is an essential part of a WS’s application logic. 
Simple API for XML (SAX) [23] and Document Object 
Model (DOM) [24] are two typical XML parsers.  
DOM parsers read the whole XML stream into the 
memory then create hierarchical objects for each node (an 
element, an attribute etc.), referenced by the application logic.  
An attacker can plot a DoS attack on a DOM-based WS by 
inputting a large XML file [25]. Such attacks (e.g. Oversize 
payload and Coercive parsing [19]) affect the availability of 
the WS by exhausting its resources and preventing legitimate 
users from accessing the service [26]. DOM parsers can also 
be subject to other types of attacks such as XML injection 
[25]. 
On the other hand, SAX parsers perform XML parsing at 
the start or end of a node without loading the whole XML 
stream into memory (they load a maximum of two elements 
into the memory at a time) [25]. Whenever the parser reaches 
a node, it triggers an event, and the program’s event handler 
  
starts processing the data. SAX-based WSs are vulnerable to 
XML injection attacks [25]. In XML injection attacks the 
attacker targets the integrity of the XML stream (e.g. SOAP 
message) by overwriting static portions of it [25]. For 
example, the attacker modifies the message by adding contents 
containing XML tags [27]. 
DoS attacks are one of the most popular attacks, which can 
be performed through a variety of techniques. This type of 
attacks exploit the vulnerabilities in XML-based documents 
(e.g. SOAP messages) targeting the parsing mechanisms and 
other resources, affecting the availability of the WS. A large 
number of these attacks, targeting well-known companies such 
as VISA and PayPal suggests that they can be a serious threat 
to today’s IT infrastructure [28]. Jensen et al. [18], [19] have 
presented a number of DoS attacks. 
E. Hash Collision (HashDoS) Attack 
Hash tables can be employed within a SOAP message to 
store values and their references (e.g. attributes and their 
corresponding namespace). Ideally each key should represent 
a unique value. If different keys represent the same value, a 
collision will happen, which results in resource intensive 
computation. An attacker can exploit a weak hash function to 
perform a DoS attack [29], [30]. 
IV. PENETRATION TESTING 
Penetration testing or static code analysis approaches can 
be employed to assess the security of a WS [31]. Penetration 
testing is an attempt to break into a system not in order to 
exploit it, but rather to identify its weaknesses [32]. The 
resistance of the system against penetration testing is a good 
indicator of its security [27]. In our approach, security 
vulnerabilities of a third party service play an important role in 
its selection. Security vulnerabilities related to WSs’ 
implementation technologies are central to our work. Hence, a 
penetration testing tool called WS-Attacker [27] is chosen for 
testing candidate third party WSs to identify their security 
vulnerabilities. The reasons for WS-Attacker selection are: (1) 
it enables testing for XML-specific security vulnerabilities 
explained in Section III (2) it performs the attacks 
automatically and (3) it is an open source penetration testing 
tool.  
WS-Attacker consists of a framework and plugins 
architecture. Its framework is based on soapUI [32] and sets 
up an environment for attacking WSs. In WS-Attacker, the 
attacks are implemented as plugins. Each plugin is an 
implementation of a model of an adversary performing one 
type of attack and allows the user to set various parameters, 
such as number of parallel attack threads, number of requests 
per thread, milliseconds between every test-probe requests, 
and milliseconds between every attack requests. WS-Attacker 
is extendable and provides a plugin interface enabling new 
attack plugins to be added to the tool [27]. A number of attack 
plugins have been developed for WS-Attacker by its 
developers and other researchers [27], [33], [28]. In 
implementing these plugins, the developers assume that the 
tester does not have a direct access to the system under attack, 
and can only examine its vulnerability to an attack by sending 
payloads to its server then evaluating its response (or its 
response time in the case of performing DoS attacks). The 
result (true or false) of performing an attack indicate whether 
it has been successful [27]. 
V. PROPOSED APPROACH 
As stated previously, WSs are at risk of security 
vulnerabilities related to their specific implementation 
technologies (e.g. XML) as well as those of their underlying 
platforms (e.g. operating systems and web-services 
frameworks) and the WSs applications themselves (e.g. being 
vulnerable to SQL injection attacks). Systems could be 
developed using services offered by different vendors. To 
explain our approach, we are assuming that we have control 
over a system that is under development, which should 
employ third party WSs. The candidate third party WS(s) may 
have security vulnerabilities. Their security vulnerabilities 
may be exploited by messages from our system’s client, the 
clients of other systems that are also employing them or their 
direct clients. The first scenario will definitely affect our 
system. The last two scenarios could affect our system as a 
result of security attacks, such as DoS, which may make the 
third party service unavailable just for few minutes or 
completely with the need to reboot.  
We propose to use an intrusion-tolerant composite WS 
(using fault tolerant techniques: N-version programming, 
diversity) for each functionality that should be fulfilled by a 
third party WS. Our proposed approach includes the following 
steps:  
Step 1. Collect as many WSs as possible, offered by 
various vendors providing the same functionality as 
required by the system. 
Step 2. Log the failure rate of each service stated in its 
Service Level Agreement (SLA). Initially the failure 
rates stated by the provider of the third party service 
will be considered but this log will be updated every 
time the service is invoked.  
Step 3. Identify their security vulnerabilities using a 
penetration testing tool (as shown in Fig. 1).  
 
Figure 1: Penetration Testing WSs. 
Step 4. Log the vulnerabilities of each service. 
Step 5. Create a composite WS out of all available 
candidate WSs for the functionality that is to be 
outsourced. 
Plugin API 
Plugin API 
WSDL 1 
  
Step 6. For each request received from a client of the 
system, scan the message to identify which security 
vulnerabilities it could exploit if it contains malicious 
contents.  
Step 7. Select all third party services without 
vulnerabilities, which could be exploited if client’s 
request contains malicious contents. The system 
understands which services should not be selected 
from the log generated in Step 4. For example a 
message with SOAPAction elements will exploit the 
security vulnerability of a third party WS to 
SOAPAction Spoofing attack if it contains malicious 
contents. Therefore, no services vulnerable to this 
type of attack should be selected if the client’s 
request contains SOAPAction elements. The number 
of the selected WSs at this stage should be greater 
than or equal to 3f+1 (f is the number of possible 
faulty replicas). Castro and Liskov [34], have 
justified the optimality of 3f+1 replicas. When the 
number of WSs without tested security vulnerabilities 
that could be exploited if client’s request contains 
malicious contents is less than 3f+1, select the 
remaining ones from WSs with security 
vulnerabilities that are of lowest priority to system 
owner and with lowest failure rates (using the log 
generated in Step 2).    
Step 8. If the number of services selected in Step 7 is 
greater than 3f+1, select the services with lowest 
failure rates (using the log generated in Step 2).  
Step 9. Invoke WSs selected in Step 8 concurrently.  
Step 10. Re-execute the WSs if all of them fail 
(Active+Time replication strategy [35]). 
Step 11. Terminate the execution of WSs as soon as 2f+1 
responses are returned.  
Step 12. Applying majority voting to identify the response 
that should be returned to the client of the system. 
VI. CASE STUDY 
To exemplify our approach we are using a stock purchase 
service. These experiments are run on Intel® Core™ i5-
3320M CPU @ 2.60GHz system with 7.88GB usable RAM 
and 64-bit Operating System. In these experiments only 
security vulnerability to Coercive parsing attack is considered 
and the Steps of our proposed approach are taken as follows: 
1. We have developed four WSs (two using Apache 
Axis2 and two using ASP.NET WS frameworks) and 
selected a third party ASP.NET WS, which provides 
similar functionality to those we have developed.  
2. No information related to failure rate of these WSs was 
available. Hence, Step 2 of our approach is omitted in 
this experiment but it will be considered in our future 
work. 
3. Each WS was tested individually for security 
vulnerability to Coercive Parsing attack by submitting 
the location of its WSDL file to WS-Attacker then 
performing the attack with settings (default settings) 
shown in Table 1. 
4. The security vulnerability of these WSs to Coercive 
Parsing attack was identified (see Table 2). As it is 
explained in section IV, the developers of WS-
Attacker’s DoS attack plugins have assumed that the 
tester does not have direct access to the system under 
attack, and can only examine its vulnerability to the 
above DoS attacks by sending payloads to its server 
then evaluating its response time. They have defined 
the response time as the time when the last byte of the 
request is sent to the server until the first byte of the 
response is received from the server [33]. In designing 
these attack plugins, all major errors, such as increase 
in response time caused by variable message sizes or 
network loads, are eliminated [33]. These attack 
plugins calculate the median of the response times of 
the last 10 tampered requests and the median of the last 
10 untampered requests. They then work out the ratio 
of the median response time of the tampered requests 
to the median response time of the untampered 
requests. Any ratio notably higher or lower than 1, will 
be interpreted as a successful attack. Refer to the 
results presented in Table 2, 100% indicates that the 
WS has vulnerability to Coercive Parsing attack and 
1% shows that it has not this vulnerability. 
5. A Business Process Execution Language (BPEL [36]) 
composite WS (shown in Fig. 2) was created using all 
all available WSs but only the three ASP.NET services 
and one of the Axis2 services (four services 
highlighted in Table 2) were invoked, addressing Steps 
5-8 of proposed approach. Steps 6-8 should be 
performed automatically, which will be addressed in 
our future work.  
6. To address the Steps 9 and 11 of our approach, all four 
services were invoked concurrently and a variable was 
dedicated to each of the concurrent processes. Upon 
receiving a response from each of the services, the 
corresponding variable would be set to a pre-defined 
value to indicate that a response is returned. A throw 
and catch exception handling was employed to 
terminate WSs execution upon receiving the first three 
responses (as soon as the dedicated variables to three 
out of four services are set to the pre-defined value).  
The composite service was then tested for security 
vulnerability to Coercive Parsing attack, using WS-Attacker 
with the same settings that were used to test individual 
services. As the results from this experiment illustrate (last 
column of Table 2), the composite service is no longer 
vulnerable to Coercive Parsing DoS attack. 
The purpose of this experiment was to exemplify our 
approach as well as testing its effectiveness as a defence 
against DoS attacks. However, our future work will (a) take 
into account the failure rate of the WSs (b) scan the client’s 
request (c) performs Step 6-12 automatically (d) employ 
majority voting. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: BPEL Diagram of the Composite Service. 
 
Table 1: Coerceive Parting Attack Settings Used for Experiments 
Security Vulnerability Type Common WS-Attacker settings Specific WS-Attacker settings 
Coercive Parsing 
2 parallel attack threads,  
4 requests per thread,  
500 milliseconds between every testprobe request,  
750 milliseconds between every attack request,  
4 seconds server recovery time,  
5 seconds stop after the last tampered request. 
75,000 nested elements 
 
Table 2: Preliminary Experimental Results 
                               Web Service   
Security                 Framework 
Vulnerability Type 
Axis2 web 
service  
Axis2 web 
service 
ASP.Net 
web service 
ASP.Net 
web service 
ASP.Net 
web service 
 
 
 
 
Composite 
service 
Coercive Parsing 100% 100% 1% 1% 1%  1% 
 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we proposed to use an intrusion-tolerant 
composite WS (using fault-tolerant techniques: N-version 
programming, diversity) for each functionality that should be 
fulfilled by a third party WS to improve the security of WSs. In 
our approach, penetration testing is used to identify security 
vulnerabilities of available functionally-equivalent candidate 
third party WSs. Suitable third party WSs will then be selected 
based on their security vulnerabilities and their performance 
according to the client’s (being the owner of the system) 
requirements. The selected services will be invoked using an 
intrusion-tolerant approach as a countermeasure against the 
security attacks exploiting the vulnerabilities that are not 
covered/identified by penetration testing. We have presented 
our preliminary experimental results indicating that an 
intrusion-tolerant composite service may reduce the security 
vulnerabilities of WS.  
Despite using an intrusion-tolerant composite service, we 
depend on a single orchestration engine, in these experiments 
BPEL, to manipulate them. Regardless of which orchestration 
engine we choose, it will always become a possible single 
point of failure. Thus, if the orchestration engine is vulnerable 
itself, then it may compromise any composite service that it 
handles. We note that in our experiments we did not observe 
this phenomenon. Standard solutions to address this concern 
would require applying-fault tolerance to the orchestration 
engines themselves, a problem which we will address in our 
future work. 
We recognise that using the proposed approach introduces 
an additional delay in processing the requests sent to the BPEL 
orchestration in comparison to the clients sending the request 
directly to the component WS. Indeed, with the BPEL 
orchestration, the client request travels first to the BPEL engine 
and then it is forwarded to each of the component WSs. The 
resulting delay may increase significantly and will depend on 
the quality and speed of the connections.  
The use of a composite service based on the best 
functionally equivalent set of diverse WSs is certainly 
beneficial for many security concerns (e.g., unavailability 
given DoS attacks). Nonetheless, if one or more of the 
underlying WSs has succumbed to an intruder, giving them 
access to incoming requests, the use of the composite service 
may actually make us more vulnerable to loss of 
BPEL Scope 
Concurrent execution 
BPEL process 
Receive client’s 
request 
ASP.NET WS 
ASP.NET WS 
ASP.NET WS 
Axis2 WS 
Throw 
Throw 
 Throw 
 Throw 
 
Catch 
If three replies are 
returned 
terminate WSs execution 
ReplyOutput 
  
confidentiality, as the requests will be sent to all of the 
underlying services, and not just one of them. Future work 
should explore how to reduce and/or mitigate this risk. In 
particular the adjudicator (performing majority voting) will 
play an important role here. We intend to study its impact 
systematically. 
Currently we are investigating the effectiveness of our 
approach using WSs developed based on various web services 
frameworks. In the near future, we will focus on the 
implementation of a complete composition framework 
supporting security-aware service selection, composition and 
adaptation. 
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